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FINDING HARMONY: LAW SOCIETY OF BRITISH
COLUMBIA V TRINITY WESTERN UNIVERSITY
Sancho McCann*
ABSTRACT
This case comment focuses on what the Supreme Court of Canada’s
2018 decision in Law Society of British Columbia v Trinity Western University
tells us about how courts should review the discretionary decisions of
administrative decision-makers for compliance with the Charter. The
majority describes this as an application of the framework from Doré
and Loyola, and I argue that the Court missed a chance to bring that
framework into conceptual harmony with that from Oakes. The Court
should be reluctant to use the framework of reasonableness and
deference set out in Doré and Loyola when the decision-maker (the Law
Society of British Columbia) fails to produce explicit written reasons
for their decision. I also argue, though, that the Court didn’t actually
defer to the Law Society. As a descriptive matter, I argue that the Court
here used a correctness standard, albeit with a degree of deference and
leeway akin to that used in the Oakes framework. As a normative
matter, I argue that this is the correct approach, and that the court
should highlight the conceptual harmony between the two approaches
rather than allowing language of reasonableness and deference to
obscure what courts are doing here. I conclude by presenting a path to
harmonizing the approaches from Doré and Loyola with that from
Oakes.
Citation: (2019) 28 Dal J Leg Stud 95.
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INTRODUCTION
On June 15, 2018, the Supreme Court of Canada released its decision in Law
Society of British Columbia v Trinity Western University.1
In this case comment, I examine the administrative law questions raised by
this case and argue that the Supreme Court missed a chance to bring the
framework from Doré2 and Loyola3 into conceptual harmony with that from
Oakes.4
The Court leaves us with three open and intertwined questions: 1) To what
extent is the analysis focused on the process or the outcome of administrative
decision-making? 2) When does the Court require written reasons from the
administrative decision-maker? and 3) Is the Court deferring to administrative
decision-makers when Charter rights are infringed?
This lack of clarity stems from unnecessary divergence between the
Doré/Loyola framework and the Oakes framework. I argue that the Court can still
capture the harmony between these frameworks. They are not different in nature.
They flex the same justificatory muscles in different contexts. I first present the
approach taken in LSBC v TWU, then present a path to harmonizing these tests
and argue that written reasons should be a factor bearing on the degree of
deference afforded to the administrative decision-maker.

BACKGROUND
Trinity Western University (TWU) is a private Christian liberal arts
university in Langley, British Columbia. TWU wanted to offer a law degree
program and, in 2012, submitted its proposal to the Federation of Law Societies
of Canada (the Federation).5 In 2013, the Federation approved the proposal. That
approval would typically be sufficient for the school to be an “approved common
See Law Society of British Columbia v Trinity Western University, 2018 SCC 32 [LSBC v TWU].
See Doré v Barreau du Québec, 2012 SCC 12 [Doré].
3 See Loyola High School v Quebec (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 12 [Loyola].
4 See R v Oakes, [1986] 1 SCR 103, 25 DLR (4th) 200 [Oakes].
5 In 2010, the provincial law societies delegated to the Federation of Law Societies of Canada the authority
to approve new law programs.
1
2
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law faculty of law”6 for the purposes of the Law Society of British Columbia
(LSBC). Graduates of the program would be eligible for admission as lawyers in
BC.7 However, the Law Society Rules provide that the LSBC Benchers could pass
a resolution to overrule this approval.8
The LSBC Benchers had concerns with TWU’s covenant which, among
other things, “calls on students to abstain from sexual intimacy outside of
opposite-sex marriage.”9 The LSBC described the issue: “[a]s a result of the
exclusionary impact of these aspects of the Covenant, the issue of whether law
societies should approve TWU’s proposed law school has divided benchers,
courts, law societies, the legal profession, and the public generally.”10
On April 11, 2014, the LSBC Benchers voted on, but failed to pass the
following resolution:11
Pursuant to Law Society Rule 2-27(4.1), the Benchers declare
that, notwithstanding the preliminary approval granted to
Trinity Western University on December 16, 2013 by the
Federation of Law Societies’ Canadian Common Law Program
Approval Committee, the proposed School of Law at Trinity
Western University is not an approved faculty of law.
The general membership of the LSBC requested a special general meeting
and at that meeting, on June 10, 2014, the membership voted (3210–968) to direct
the Benchers to adopt the resolution to not approve the law school.12
The Benchers decided to hold a referendum to get even broader input from
the membership. They “agreed to be bound by the results only if one-third of
members voted in the referendum and two-thirds of the votes were in favour of
Law Society Rules 2015, Rule 2-54(2)(a), online: <https://www.lawsociety.bc.ca/support-and-resources-forlawyers/act-rules-and-code/law-society-rules/>.
7 Ibid, Rule 2-54(3), formerly rule 2-27 (“[f]or the purposes of this rule, a common law faculty of law is
approved if it has been approved by the Federation of Law Societies of Canada unless the Benchers adopt a
resolution declaring that it is not or has ceased to be an approved faculty of law”).
8 Ibid.
9 Law Society of British Columbia v Trinity Western University, 2018 SCC 32 (Factum of the Respondent at para 16
[FOR]).
10 Law Society of British Columbia v Trinity Western University, 2018 SCC 32 (Factum of the Appellant at
para 42 [FOA]).
11 LSBC v TWU, supra note 1 at para 16.
12 Ibid at paras 17–18.
6
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implementing the June 10, 2014 resolution.”13 5951 members voted in favour of
the resolution to not approve the law school; 2088 members voted against the
resolution.14 Adhering to the results of the referendum, the Benchers passed a
resolution declaring that TWU’s proposed law school was not approved. In
response, BC’s Minister of Advanced Education also withdrew their approval.15

JUDICIAL HISTORY
TWU challenged this resolution in the British Columbia Supreme Court,
claiming that the Benchers’ decision infringed their religious freedom, a Charterprotected right. The BCSC agreed and said that by binding themselves to the
referendum results, the Benchers did not conduct the balancing that is required
when the government infringes a Charter right. The Court quashed the Benchers’
resolution, leaving in place the national Federation’s approval of the law school.16
The LSBC appealed to the Court of Appeal for British Columbia. The Court
dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the BCSC that the Benchers “improperly
fettered their discretion by binding themselves to the referendum results.”17
The LSBC then appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada.
At the Supreme Court

Both parties argued that the appropriate standard of review was
correctness.18 TWU’s argument was that if the Court were to use a different
proportionality test depending on whether a right is infringed by statute or by an
administrative decision-maker, “[a] person’s rights are not uniform but their
content will depend in part on whether they are subject to interference by
administrative decision or legislation.”19 LSBC argued for correctness because
Ibid at para 20.
Ibid at para 21.
15 Ibid at para 22.
16 Ibid at paras 23–24.
17 Ibid at para 25.
18 See FOA, supra note 10 at paras 75–90; FOR, supra note 9 at para 50.
19 FOR, supra note 9 at para 52, citing Tom Hickman, “Adjudicating Constitutional Rights in Administrative
Law” (2016) 66 U Toronto LJ 121 at 166.
13
14
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this issue demands “a single answer from the courts” 20, and because a
reasonableness analysis that depends on “justification, transparency, and
intelligibility … cannot be meaningfully conducted in the absence of a single set
of reasons.”21
The majority (Justices Abella, Moldaver, Karakatsanis, Wagner and Gascon)
decided in favour of the LSBC, but under a reasonableness standard following
Doré and Loyola (both also authored by Justice Abella). The majority held that the
Benchers, as administrative decision-makers, were entitled to deference under the
Doré/Loyola framework. Given that the Benchers’ resolution implicated a Charter
right,22 the reasonableness review requires the Court to ensure that the resolution
reflects a proportionate balance between the administrative decision-maker’s
mandate and the Charter right that is burdened.23 The majority found that the
Benchers’ resolution was consistent with such a proportionate balance. It was
therefore reasonable and allowed to stand. Chief Justice McLachlin wrote a solo
concurrence that worked toward bringing Doré and Loyola into harmony with
Oakes. As in Loyola, Chief Justice McLachlin splits from the majority’s approach
to deference.24

DISCUSSION
The Court had an opportunity to clarify the Doré/Loyola framework and its
relationship with the Oakes test in a manner that would have brought them into
clearer harmony.
In Doré (confirmed in Loyola) the Court held that when an administrative
decision is reviewed for compliance with the Charter, the standard of review is

FOA, supra note 10 at para 75.
Ibid at paras 87–89.
22 Eight of the nine justices found that the Benchers’ decision did infringe upon the religious freedom of the
TWU community. My focus here is how that infringement had to be balanced against the statutory mandate
given to the LSBC.
23 There is a disagreement between the majority and the concurring and dissenting justices regarding the role
that Charter values play compared to Charter rights. This comment does not focus on that aspect of the
opinions. See generally LSBC v TWU, supra note 1 at paras 166–175, Rowe J, concurring; LSBC v TWU,
supra note 1 at para 115, McLachlin CJC, concurring.
24 See Loyola, supra note 3 (McLachlin CJC and Moldaver J did not use the Doré analysis in their concurrence).
20
21
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reasonableness rather than a full Section 1 Oakes analysis.25 The reasonableness
review of Doré asks whether the “decision reflects a proportionate balancing of
the Charter protections at play.”26 This proportionality analysis looks at both
minimal impairment and balancing.27 By contrast, the Oakes analysis has a
preliminary step that asks whether the limit of a Charter protection is designed to
serve a pressing and substantial objective. It then has the court assess whether
there is a rational connection between the limitation and the objective, whether
the impairment of the Charter protection is as minimal as possible in light of the
objective, and whether there is a proportionate balance between the deleterious
effects of the limitation, the pressing and substantial objective, and the salutary
effects actually resulting from the implementation.28
As a descriptive matter, I argue that the Court here used a correctness
standard, albeit with a degree of deference and leeway akin to that used in the
Oakes framework. As a normative matter, I argue that this is the correct approach,
and that the court should highlight the conceptual harmony between the two
approaches rather than allowing language of reasonableness and deference to
obscure what courts are doing here.
Instead of leaving us with conceptual harmony, the Court leaves us with
several open and intertwined questions stemming from the above discrepancy. 1)
To what extent is the analysis focused on the process or the outcome of
administrative decision-making? 2) When does the Court require written reasons
from the administrative decision-maker? and 3) Is the Court deferring to
administrative decision-makers when Charter rights are infringed?
Whose Proportionate Balancing?

Does the decision under challenge need to merely reflect a proportionate
balancing? Or does it need to reflect the decision-maker’s proportionate balancing?

See Doré, supra note 2 at paras 3–5.
Doré, supra note 2 at para 57.
27 See Loyola, supra note 3 at para 40.
28 See Oakes, supra note 4 at paras 73-74; Dagenais v Canadian Broadcasting Corp, [1994] 3 SCR 835 at paras 9697.
25
26
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If the decision needs to only reflect a proportionate balancing (for example, one
that the reviewing court happens to work through), then the review becomes
entirely outcome-focused. This approach to review would not distinguish
between good-faith efforts to balance and processes that are improperly tainted
by invidious motives. As long as the outcome is within the range of outcomes
that the court could imagine as striking a proportionate balance, the decision
would stand.
Can proportionate balancing (on the part of the decision-maker) even take
place through a referendum process? The concern is that the decision-maker is
prevented from doing proportionate balancing if they rely exclusively on the
outcome of a referendum and are bound by its results. The majority addresses
the appropriateness of the referendum process:
The Benchers concluded that they were authorized under the
LPA to proceed as they did. Section 13 of the LPA provides
that the LSBC members can elect to bind the Benchers to
implement the results of a referendum of members in certain
circumstances. This provision indicates the legislature’s intent
that the LSBC’s decisions be guided by the views of its full
membership, at least in some circumstances. However, s. 13
does not limit the circumstances in which the Benchers can elect
to be bound to implement the results of a referendum of
members. The Benchers were therefore not precluded from
holding a referendum merely because all of the circumstances
described in s. 13 were not present.29
Even if Section 13 does not limit the Benchers this way, the requirement for
proportionate balancing might. The majority even says: “that reasonableness
review is concerned both with ‘the reasonableness of the substantive outcome of
the decision, and with the process of articulating that outcome’.”30
Certainly, it was open to the Benchers to seek the “guidance or support of the
membership as a whole.”31 However, that does not imply that a binding
referendum is a display of discretion and proportionate balancing. Nor does a
referendum preclude proportionate balancing. It is possible to exercise discretion
LSBC v TWU, supra note 1 at para 49.
Ibid at para 52.
31 Ibid at para 50.
29
30
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and proportionate balancing even after holding a referendum, but without written
reasons, we cannot know whether this happened. The majority says this does not
matter, though.32 They say it is sufficient that the Benchers were “alive to the
issues.”33
The majority relies on Catalyst Paper Corp v North Cowichan (District) for the
proposition that not all administrative decision-making requires formal reasons
and that requirements “vary with the context and nature of the decision-making
process...”34 In Catalyst, the Court held that “there was no duty to give formal
reasons in a context where the decision was made by elected representatives
pursuant to a democratic process.”35 However, this is a different context. Catalyst
is distinguishable because the elected representatives in that case were elected by
the general population, and democratically accountable to the general population.
In this case, the elected representatives of the LSBC are elected only by the
membership of the LSBC, and not democratically accountable to those whose
rights are infringed by their decision. In Catalyst, the Court said:
To demand that councillors who have just emerged from a heated
debate on the merits of a bylaw get together to produce a coherent
set of reasons is to misconceive the nature of the democratic process
that prevails in the Council Chamber.36
However, when an administrative decision-maker who is insulated from
democratic accountability to the general population infringes a Charter-protected
right, we can require that the process have a different nature, at least if the Court
is going to continue to review these decisions under the guise of deference. This
may all be beside-the-point, though. The standard of review is strict—in fact,

Ibid at para 55 (“… the LSBC was not required to give reasons formally explaining why the decision to
refuse to approve TWU’s proposed law school amounted to a proportionate balancing of freedom of
religion with the statutory objectives of the LPA”).
33 Ibid at para 56 (“[as] the Benchers were alive to the issues, we must then assess the reasonableness of their
decision. Reasonableness review requires a respectful attention to the reasons offered or which could be
offered in support of a decision” [emphasis in original]).
34 LSBC v TWU, supra note 1 at para 53; Catalyst Paper Corp v North Cowichan (District), 2012 SCC 2 at
para 29 [Catalyst].
35 LSBC v TWU, supra note 1 at para 53.
36 Catalyst, supra note 35 at para 29.
32
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approaching correctness—despite the language of “reasonableness” and
“deference.”37
Is This Really Deference?

Reasonableness may make sense as the standard of review for administrative
decision-makers more generally, when their actions do not burden a Charter right.
But when their actions do burden a Charter right, the Court has clarified that
reasonableness necessitates a proportionate balancing.
The reviewing court must consider whether there were other
reasonable possibilities that would give effect to Charter
protections more fully in light of the objectives. This does not
mean that the administrative decision-maker must choose the
option that limits the Charter protection least. … However, if there
was an option or avenue reasonably open to the decision-maker that would
reduce the impact on the protected right while still permitting him or her to
sufficiently further the relevant statutory objectives, the decision would not
fall within a range of reasonable outcomes.38
This is a correctness review, or at least as much as is Oakes. The requirement
to choose an option or avenue that has a lesser impact on the protected right
(while sufficiently furthering the statutory objectives) is akin to the minimal
impairment component of the Oakes framework. It obscures the law to call this a
reasonableness review.
Chief Justice McLachlin observed:
I would note that relying on the language of “deference” and
“reasonableness” in this context may be unhelpful. Quite
simply, where an administrative decision-maker renders a
decision that has an unjustified and disproportionate impact on
a Charter right, it will always be unreasonable.39
In the case of a yes-or-no decision, this review even more obviously
collapses to a correctness review, but this can get lost in language like “the range

See LSBC v TWU, supra note 1 at para 118, McLachlin CJC, concurring.
Ibid at para 81 [emphasis added].
39 Ibid at para 118, McLachlin CJC, concurring.
37
38
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of possible, acceptable outcomes.”40 Given the binary choice available to the
Benchers, the range of possible, acceptable outcomes was a single outcome: that
the LSBC not approve the law school.
Conceptual Harmony

The Court can still capture the conceptual harmony between Doré/Loyola
and Oakes. They are not different in nature. They flex the same “justificatory
muscles”, just in different contexts.41 The Doré/Loyola analysis raises the same
considerations as in Oakes, adjusted to make conceptual and grammatical sense
when there is “no law” to review.42
Oakes incorporates context and deference just as does Doré/Loyola.43 And
Doré/Loyola is robust oversight: the word “deference” might even be misleading.44
The Court has emphasized that this is “strong” reasonableness not “watereddown” proportionality.45
If we must use the word deference when reviewing Charter infringements in
the administrative law context, a helpful alternative might be qualified deference.46
The framework set out by Doré and Loyola is still inspired by Oakes. Yes, there is
a shift in emphasis toward the proportionality step, but this shift in emphasis, and
the deference, is only given to the extent that the decision-making process
displays factors that warrant such deference.
The factors that attract a degree of deference are similar across both tests.
These factors include proximity to the facts of the case,47 expertise and
LSBC v TWU, supra note 1 at para 52, citing Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9 at para 47.
Doré, supra note 2 at para 5; Loyola, supra note 3 at para 40; LSBC v TWU, supra note 1 at para 82.
42 See Doré, supra note 2 at para 39; LSBC v TWU, supra note 1 at para 114, McLachlin CJC, concurring.
43 See RJR-MacDonald Inc v Canada (Attorney General), [1995] 3 SCR 199 at para 160, 127 DLR (4th) 1, (“[t]he
tailoring process seldom admits of perfection and the courts must accord some leeway to the legislator. If
the law falls within a range of reasonable alternatives, the courts will not find it overbroad merely because
they can conceive of an alternative which might better tailor objective to infringement”); see also R v MalmoLevine, 2003 SCC 74 at para 177 (not in the Oakes context, but says, “[w]hile somewhat different
considerations come into play under a Charter analysis, it remains important that some deference be accorded
to Parliament in assessing the utility of its chosen responses to perceived social ills”).
44 See LSBC v TWU, supra note 1 (“…where an administrative decision-maker renders a decision that has an
unjustified and disproportionate impact on a Charter right, it will always be unreasonable” at para 118,
McLachlin CJC, concurring).
45 Ibid at para 80; Loyola, supra note 3 at para 38.
46 Alternatively: conditional deference.
47 Doré, supra note 2 at para 54.
40
41
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specialization48, and the balancing of competing interests in the context of
conflicting evidence.49 Moreover, these factors are precisely why the legislature
would have delegated decision-making authority in the first place, so will often
be present in the administrative-law context. However, consistent with LSBC v
TWU, there should be an additional factor at play in the administrative-law
context in order to attract deference when a Charter protection is infringed:
transparency of reasons. In LSBC v TWU, because the Court lacked reasons from
the decision-maker, the majority was forced to create its own reasons, its own
balancing, and focused its analysis on the outcome.50
Several of the justifications for deferring to administrative decision-makers
are not furthered without written reasons. Doré mentions that administrative
decision-makers are a “…rich source of thought and experience about law…”51
Doré also sees these administrative bodies as doing adjudication.52 Professor Mary
Liston refers to this “institutional dialogue” as a balance between judicial
accountability and public-law accountability.53 Explicit, written reasons would
further each of these views of deference.

CONCLUSION
When a Charter right is burdened by an administrative decision or by a law,
courts should apply the same stringent review. In LSBC v TWU, the court applied
such a review. Doré/Loyola and Oakes are just two flavours of the same inquiry.
To the extent that the Court continues to defer to administrative decision-makers
in their assessment of proportionality, a lack of explicit and transparent reasoning
should be a factor that weighs against such deference. Encouraging decisionmakers to explicitly reason through this balancing process furthers the

Ibid at para 47.
See Irwin Toy Ltd v Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] 1 SCR 927 at 993; Doré, supra note 2 at para 50.
50 LSBC v TWU, supra note 1 at para 56, Abella, Moldaver, Karakatsanis, Wagner, and Gascon JJ, and para
300, Côté and Brown JJ, dissenting.
51 Doré, supra note 2 at para 27, citing John Evans, “The Principles of Fundamental Justice: The Constitution
and the Common Law” (1991) 29 Osgood Hall LJ 51 at 73.
52 Ibid at para 30 (“courts do not have a monopoly on adjudication”).
53 Mary Liston, “Governments in Miniature: The Rule of Law in the Administrative State” in Colleen M
Flood & Lorne Sossin, eds, Administrative Law in Context (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 2008) 77 at 113.
48
49
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justifications of administrative deference and can help reinforce the norm that it
is the government’s duty to balance competing rights in good-faith.

